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IMPROVING CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Welsh S. White*
THE FAILURE OF TiiE CruMIN.t\L PROCEDURE REVOLUTION. By

Craig M. Bradley. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
1993. Pp. x, 264. $34.95.

For criminal procedure aficionados, the 1960s were an exciting
period. In almost every year of that decade, the Supreme Court
handed down a landmark criminal procedure decision establishing
new rights for criminal suspects. In 1961, for example, Mapp v.
Ohio1 held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies
in state as well as federal criminal cases. Two years later, Gideon v.
Wainwright2 held that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to
representation by counsel at trial. In 1966, Miranda v. Arizona3 reshaped the law of police interrogation,4 and a trilogy of cases decided in 19675 sought to improve the fairness of police identification
procedures.6 As Craig Bradley7 explains in his engaging and provocative book, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolunon,
by the time Chief Justice Warren left the Court in 1969, criminal
procedure had entered a new era. In place of the old regime, under
which only the Court's "shock the conscience" or "fundamental
fairness" test checked the states' freedom to regulate criminal pro-

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard; L.L.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I would like to thank Albert Alschuler, Randy Lee, Jules Lobel,
Anne Schiff, and my wife Linda who commented on earlier drafts of this review and Melanie
Bradish who assisted in preparing the footnotes.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 384 U.S. 436 {1966).
4. In Miranda, the Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination." 384 U.S. at 444.
5. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 {1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (establishing that a criminal defendant has the right to have
counsel present at a pretrial lineup); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 (same); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301302 (establishing that pretrial identifications that are unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identifications must be excluded as violations of due process).
7. Craig Bradley, who was a law clerk to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is presently a professor
of law at the University of Indiana.
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cedure,8 the Supreme Court had established what Judge Henry
Friendly critically characterized as a constitutional code of criminal
procedure.9
Bradley provides an interesting and generally accurate account
of the criminal procedure changes effected by the Warren Court. In
evaluating the criminal procedure revolution, he observes that the
Warren Court decisions resulted in salutary changes that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not altered. Not only are
criminal defendants afforded substantially greater protections at
trial,10 but also "police respect for constitutional rights has increased considerably" (p. 37). In support of the latter statement,
Bradley observes with approval that police receive training in criminal procedure, prosecutors place pressure on the police to follow
the law, and "[t]he 'third degree' seems to have largely disappeared
from the American scene" (p. 37).
Nevertheless, Bradley claims that "the criminal procedure
revolution has failed because it does not provide adequate guidance
to police as to what to do" (pp. 37-38). Using interesting hypotheticals devised by himself and Professor Albert Alschuler (pp. 52-54),
as well as statistical data (pp. 46-47), Bradley maintains that the
Court's decisions on search and seizure and on confessions are virtually incomprehensible.11 As a result, the Court's criminal procedure rules provide inadequate guidance to the police and result in
"disturbingly high numbers of cases lost due to evidentiary exclusion" (p. 44).
·
In the remainder of his book, Bradley offers an explanation for
this unfortunate state of affairs and several suggestions for correcting it. In a chapter that is particularly interesting because it
draws from the firsthand knowledge he gained as a Supreme Court
clerk,12 Bradley asserts that the lack of clarity in our constitutional
8. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Due process of law .•• precludes defining, and thereby confining •.. standards of conduct more precisely than to say
that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' ").
9. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 262-63 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that criminal defendants
have a right to trial by an impartial jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(holding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a speedy trial); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants have a constitu~
tional right to the assistance of appointed counsel).
11. Bradley maintains that the Supreme Court has not established a comprehensive body
of confession or search law because of its case-specific system. As a result of this system,
"criminal procedure law will only become more and more murky and difficult as police and
courts try to wade through an ever-growing body of complex precedent looking in vain for
ever-more-elusive answers to everyday questions." P. 55.
12. Pp. 62-94. Bradley explains the evolution of Supreme Court decisions. He suggests,
for example, that certain parts of the majority opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), may have been included so that Justice Stewart, who wrote that opinion, would be
able to persuade as many Justices as possible to join the majority opinion, rather than simply
concurring in the result Pp. 65-66.
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criminal procedure rules cannot be attributed to the ideological
makeup of either the Warren or the Burger-Rehnquist Courts, but
is instead an inevitable byproduct of the way the Court operates as
an institution (p. 62).
In seeking a corrective device to address this problem, Bradley
examines the experience of six other countries.13 While he does not
endorse the specific approaches of any of these countries, Bradley
suggests that their experiences provide at least two valuable lessons.
First, a discretionary exclusionary rule may be preferable to a
mandatory one.14 Second, a legislative body can more effectively
provide criminal procedure rules than a court (p. 130). Bradley
then presents his primary proposal for improving constitutional
rules of criminal procedure: Congress should appoint a special
commission to codify rules of criminal procedure. The task of this
commission would be largely limited "to codifying and clarifying
current Supreme Court law, and to making the rules more comprehensive, rather than substantially changing the law's ideological
content" (p. 145).
Anyone who is interested in either criminal procedure or the
Supreme Court should read this book. Bradley is a fluent writer
who makes the issues he discusses vivid and interesting. Moreover,
his analysis is never superficial or ideological. He has formulated a
thoughtful proposal and provided a sophisticated analysis of the
benefits and detriments of its implementation. Even those who disagree with Bradley's principal positions will be impressed by his insights and will gain a deeper understanding of our criminal justice
system from his book.
I am one of those who disagree with Bradley's principal contentions. In this review, I will discuss several of his positions and my
objections. Part I addresses Bradley's premise that the lack of clarity in the Court's criminal procedure decisions stems from the
Court's limitations as an institution. While agreeing with Bradley
that some of the Court's criminal procedure rules are hopelessly
muddled, this Part challenges Bradley's claim that the Supreme
Court could not have done any better. It asserts that the rules' lack
of clarity stems more from the ideological differences between the
Warren Court and its successors than from any inherent limitations
13. Bradley examines criminal procedure practices in England, France, Germany, Italy,
Canada, and Australia. P. 95.
14. P. 129. Bradley is somewhat ambivalent regarding his preference for a discretionary
exclusionary rule. He observes that, unlike a mandatory rule, a nonmandatory exclusionary
rule will, in most cases, result in nonexclusion. Additionally, he states that if he were drafting
legislation, he might not include a discretionary exclusionary rule because it is such a major
departure from current Jaw. Nevertheless, he intimates that a discretionary exclusionary rule
would be preferable to our present exclusionary rule (p. 56) and states that "the uniform
practice of other countries in this regard cannot be ignored" (p. 132).
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of the Court. Part II addresses Bradley's suggestion that a discretionary exclusionary rule may be preferable to a mandatory one.
While not disputing his claim that this approach works well in other
countries, this Part maintains that it would not be efficacious in this
country. Part III addresses Bradley's proposal that Congress empower a federal commission to enact a code of constitutional criminal procedure. For both theoretical and practical political reasons,
this Part concludes that the proposed commission would not improve our system of justice. Finally, Part IV briefly addresses the
question whether the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution
failed.

I.

CLARITY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

What makes the rules of criminal procedure complicated? In
many cases, the police precipitate the uncertainty by pushing for
exceptions to a rule that seems clear. If the Court responds by establishing an exception, the police will interpret that exception,
"apply [it] themselves and ... push [it] to the limit."15 If in response the Court establishes further exceptions or broadens the existing one, the law is likely to become unclear.
Miranda, 16 the Warren Court's landmark decision on confessions, may not be a model of clarity in every respect.17 But the
Court did seem clear in identifying the content of the warnings the
police are required to give criminal suspects before subjecting them
to custodial interrogation.18 In response to Miranda, many police
departments issued cards imprinted with the four specified warnings so that the police could read them to suspects. 19 Consistent
with Miranda, one of the warnings invariably told suspects that they
had the right to have an attorney present during police interrogation even if they could not afford to hire one.
Police in Hammond, Indiana, added a phrase to this standard
warning, however. After stating that the suspect had the right to
the advice and presence of a lawyer even if he could not afford to
pay for one, the warning continued, "We have no way of giving you
a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when
you go to court."20 This warning is arguably inconsistent with Miranda's requirement that the police inform the suspect that he will
15. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 {1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[F]ine points of [Miranda's] scheme are
far less clear than the Court admits.").
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.
19. See United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 613 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
20. Duckworth v. ~agan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843
F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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be provided with an attorney before any interrogation.21 At best, it
is confusing.22 Nevertheless, in Duckworth v. Eagan, 2 3 the Court, in
a 5-4 decision, held that the warning did not violate Miranda.
Professor Yale Kamisar has argued that because of the contradictory message contained in the Hammond, Indiana, warnings,
Duckworth is inconsistent with Miranda. 24 I agree. My point, however, is not that Duckworth is wrong but that it creates an uncertain
exception to a rule that prior to Duckworth appeared clear. Moreover, after Duckworth, what further exceptions are the police likely
to seek? As Kamisar says, "Many new versions of the Miranda
warnings are likely to emerge (and some once-disapproved formulations are likely to resurface)."25 Duckworth sends the message to
the police that the content of the required Miranda warnings is not
nearly so inflexible as they may have thought. As a result, an area
of the law that once seemed clear has become unclear.
Many other post-Warren Court decisions have also obscured the
meaning of Miranda. 26 To take another example, Miranda provided a seemingly clear rule governing a warned suspect's request
for counsel: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."27 In Edwards v. Arizona, 28 the Burger Court reaffirmed this rule but established an exception to it: once the suspect asserted his right to an
attorney, the police would have to cease the interrogation until an
attorney was made available to him "unless the accused himself ini21. Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause
Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BuLL. 550, 552-53 (1989).
22. See United States ex rel Williams v. 1\vomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting a virtually identical warning on the grounds that it was "misleading," "confusing,"
and "contradictory").
23. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
24. Kamisar, supra note 21, at 552-53. In Duckworth, the warnings gave suspects a contradictory message because they told suspects that they had the right to the advice and the
presence of a lawyer but that the police had no way of providing them with a lawyer. Thus,
the warning is inconsistent with Miranda because Miranda held that the police must inform
suspects that they are entitled to a lawyer prior to any interrogation, even if they cannot
afford one.
25. Id. at 561. For example, a past formulation of the second Miranda warning, "anything
you say can and will [or may] be used against you," which has been rejected but may resurface, is a warning advising suspects that anything they say can be used "for or against" them.
As Kamisar observes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated this warning in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 266 A.2d 753 (Pa 1970). See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 561.
26. See pp. 53-54 (quoting Albert Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1442-43 (1987) (describing a hypothetical "police training manual" - offering advice that will allow officers to avoid the effect of Miranda - that
provides excellent examples of exceptions to Miranda that the post-Warren Court established
and of the effect that those exceptions may have on police interrogation practices)).
27. 384 U.S. at 474.
28. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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tiate[d] further communications, exchanges, or conversations with
the police. "29
On its face, the Edwards "initiation" exception to Miranda may
not have seemed very significant. Taken in context, Edwards
seemed to suggest that, once the accused invoked his right to an
attorney, the police could not attempt further interrogation unless
the accused on his own initiative indicated to the police that he had
changed his mind and would prefer to discuss the criminal charges
with the police without the presence of counsel. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 30 however, the Court interpreted the "initiated further communications" exception much more broadly.
In Bradshaw, the police gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and the defendant asserted his right to an attorney. The police
then terminated the interrogation. A few minutes later, the defendant said, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" After
rewaming the defendant of his Miranda rights, the police interrogated the defendant and obtained a confession.31 The Court split 44 as to whether the defendant's question, "Well, what is going to
happen to me now?" constituted "initiating" communications
within the meaning of Edwards. Speaking for four Justices, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that it did meet the Edwards standard because "[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case
as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. "32 A
fifth Justice, Powell, declined to accept Edwards's test but agreed
with the Rehnquist plurality that the lower court properly admitted
the defendant's confession.33
After Edwards and Bradshaw, it will admittedly be difficult to
determine when courts will permit the police to resume the interrogation of a suspect who has invoked his right to an attorney. If,
after requesting an attorney, the suspect makes any substantive
statement to the police,34 the police may have legitimate doubts as
to whether the suspect's statement constitutes an "initiation" of
communications that will permit them to resume their efforts at in29. 451 U.S. at 485.
30. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
31. 462 U.S. at 1042 (quoting App. at 16).
32. 462 U.S. at 1045-46.
33. Justice Powell agreed with the Rehnquist plurality that the lower court properly admitted the confession because the facts and circumstances established a valid waiver. 462
U.S. at 1050 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion observed that "some inquiries, such as a request
for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone •.• are so routine that they cannot be
fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." 462 U.S. at 1045. Beyond that,
however, the Court provided no guidelines as to when a suspect's statement to the police
would constitute "initiation."
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terrogation. But are the police to be pitied because of this uncertainty in the law? If the police had simply complied with Miranda's
rule that interrogation must cease once the suspect requests an attorney, no uncertainty would exist. Successful police efforts to create and then exploit an exception to that rule caused the
uncertainty.
If the Court had resisted police efforts to create exceptions to
Miranda, Miranda's mandate would have been clearer. As Bradley
points out (pp. 72-73), however, the post-Warren Court did not
agree with Miranda and, yet, was reluctant to overrule it. Professor
Geoffrey R. Stone somewhat euphemistically explained that this
conflict "exert[ed] considerable strain on the [C]ourt in its efforts to
deal forthrightly with the issues posed by [Miranda]. " 35 In fact, as
Bradley's examples (pp. 51-54), as well as those discussed above,
demonstrate, the post-Warren Court has frequently distorted Miranda or distinguished the case on disingenuous grounds. As a result, Miranda's clarity, which could have been one of its strengths,36
has been seriously compromised.
The clarity of the Warren Court's search and seizure decisions
has been similarly eroded. In Chimel v. California, 37 one of the
Warren Court's last cases, the Court overruled a nineteen-year-old
precedent38 and established a new rule governing an officer's authority to search incident to arrest. That rule, which limited an arresting officer's power to search to the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee,39 seemed to be based on the principle that
the scope of an officer's right to search without a warrant should be
limited by the exigencies justifying such a search. An arresting officer can search the arrestee's person and the area within his reach
without a warrant because such a search is necessary to prevent the
arrestee from using a weapon against the officer or from immediately destroying evidence. Because no further warrantless search is
justified, no further search is permitted.
Although Chimel only decided the scope of an officer's power to
make a warrantless search incident to an arrest, the decision's rationale could be applied to govern other warrantless search situations. In general, the police should not be permitted to make a
warrantless search unless the search is justified by a special govern35. Geoffrey Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. Cr. REv. 99.
36. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ("Miranda's holding has the
virtue of infonning police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation and of infonning courts under what circumstances statements
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.").
37. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
39. 395 U.S. at 763.
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mental interest. As Bradley recognizes,40 this rule would be clear
even though it would not dictate a clear result in every case. The
police would know that before making a search, they are required
to obtain a warrant unless they can show that taking the time to
obtain a warrant would lead to some special problem such as danger to themselves or the loss of evidence.
If the post-Warren Court had applied this principle, many of the
anomalies in our law of search and seizure would not have arisen.
Because there would have been no reason to distinguish between
container searches41 and auto searches,42 for example, the Court
would not have had to resolve puzzling issues relating to whether
the search of a container found in an automobile should be treated
as a container search requiring a warrant43 or as a part of an auto
search not requiring a warrant.44 In that situation, as in others, the
police would have to obtain a search warrant unless they could
point to some exigent circumstances. As with confessions, however,
the post-Warren Court was tom between adhering to precedent and
interpreting the Fourth Amendment in a way that would serve the
interests of law enforcement. As a result, the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has become the "mass of contradictions
and obscurities"45 that Bradley deplores.
Bradley is correct in pointing out that the Court is institutionally
incapable of rendering a coherent and comprehensive set of rules
governing police practices.46 Nevertheless, the incredible confusion
caused by the present constitutional rules governing police practices
can be attributed more to the ideological tension between the Warren Court and its successors than to any inherent limitations in the
Court's institutional structure. This point, which is not recognized
by Bradley, bears on the theoretical viability of his principal
proposal.47
40. In a chapter entitled "Alternative Models of Criminal Procedure," Bradley characterizes this approach as "Model I" and asserts that one of its benefits is that it would generally
lead to clear results. See pp. 168-70.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 {1977) {holding that absent exigent
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial warrant to search a container).
42. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (establishing that warrantless
searches of automobiles are generally permissible).
43. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1979).
44. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570-73 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 799 {1982).
45. P. 49 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, '.IWo Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1468, 1468 (1985)).
46. For a discussion of the reasons for the Court's inability to perform this task, see infra
text accompanying notes 84-86.
47. See infra Part III.
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DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION

Bradley asserts that there are two kinds of unreasonable
searches: searches that are flagrantly unreasonable because the police conduct "is offensive" or "obviously violates a clear rule," and
searches that are unreasonable because they "break rules the Court
has deemed important" (p. 56). He observes that in the six other
countries he has studied, evidence obtained from the second type of
unreasonable search is not subject to mandatory exclusion. Indeed,
he concludes that the United States "is unique in having a (theoretically) mandatory rule for searches that are 'unreasonable' only because they break the (often confusing) rules" (p. 48). Drawing
from this experience, Bradley proposes that a new American code
adopt a discretionary exclusionary rule (p. 56).
At first blush, Bradley's proposal seems attractive. If a discretionary exclusionary rule has worked in other countries; why not try
it here? Moreover, as Bradley observes (p. 131), providing a court
with this option might lead it to be more forthright in deciding
whether the police violated a constitutional norm. Instead of
straining the law to avoid the drastic remedy of exclusion, a court
would be able to hold that the police violated the constitution thus providing guidance in future cases - and, yet, admit the evidence obtained.
There is, however, some danger in assuming that remedies effective in other countries will also work in this country. As Professor
Phillip Johnson has pointed out, in seeking to improve our system
of justice, our unique set of attitudes and traditions dictates that
"[w]e can no more import our solutions than we can export our
problems."48 Thus, before we decide whether to follow other countries in adopting a discretionary exclusionary rule, some of the pertinent differences between this country and other nations must be
examined.
One obvious difference is that, unlike other countries, the
United States has a constitutional provision that prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In this country, therefore, the Court
has a special obligation. In addition to defining the content of the
constitutional provision - that is, determining what is a reasonable
search or seizure - the Court must provide some means of enforcing the constitutional prohibition. Otherwise, the constitutional
provision will be reduced to a "form of words."49
In theory, of course, there are many ways of enforcing the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. For example,
courts could allow tort remedies for victims of unreasonable
48. Phillip E. Johnson, Importing Justice, '01 YALE LJ. 406, 414 {1977) (book review).
49. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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searches, preside over criminal prosecutions of police who conduct
unreasonable searches, or even mandate that police departments
issue guidelines to minimize such searches. In practice, however,
the only remedy that has ever made the Fourth Amendment meaningful to the police has been the exclusionary rule.so
Before Mapp v. Ohio,s1 police in jurisdictions that did not have
the exclusionary rule "were not aware that constitutional standards
for search and seizure had been applied to them. "52 Indeed, after
the Mapp decision, the New York City Police Commissioner said
that the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule had had a "traumatic effect" on his department, requiring a wholesale reevaluation
of procedures.53 Of course, Mapp had imposed no new Fourth
Amendment restrictions on the police. From the police perspective, however, there had been no Fourth Amendment prohibition
until the Court adopted the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule has now become a part of our culture.
Professor Milton A. Loewenthal's comprehensive study of police
attitudes54 concludes that the police "could neither understand nor
respect a Court which purported to impose constitutional standards
on the police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of
those standards. "55 Just as repealing the exclusionary rule would
signal the police that the Fourth Amendment standards are not to
be taken seriously,56 making the exclusionary rule discretionary
would signal the police that in those situations in which the Court
will not exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, the Fourth
Amendment no longer applies.
Bradley observes that his experiences in Germany and Australia
led him to believe that "a 'discretionary' exclusionary rule was no
exclusionary rule - a remedy that was paid lip service by the
courts but was not seriously enforced, and hence had no substantial
impact on police behavior" (p. 130). His study of other countries,
however, especially Great Britain and Canada, convinced him that
a discretionary exclusionary rule could be effective in this country
(p. 130).
50. See Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Responsibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-23 {1987).
51. 367 U.S. 643 {1961).
52. Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49
UMKC L. REV. 24, 29 (1980).
53. Yale Kamisar, The exclusionary rule in historical perspective: the struggle to make the
Fourth Amendment more than "an empty blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 347 {1979).
54. Loewenthal, supra note 52.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 30; see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Ori·
gins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1386 (1983).
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Is there reason to believe that our courts' administration of a
discretionary exclusionary rule would be similar to the administration of such a rule in England and Canada? In England, it is part of
the political culture for the legislature to protect minority rights.
Indeed, it has been observed that "to transgress the rights of the
individual or the minority is bad politics."57 That level of concern
for preventing official lawlessness has never been present in this
country.
Changing the exclusionary rule from mandatory to discretionary
would have a profound effect on judicial behavior. If the exclusionary rule is mandatory, the conscientious judge will be able to say he
had no choice: the law required him to exclude the evidence. If the
exclusionary rule is discretionary, however, the judge cannot make
this statement. He may properly exercise his discretion to admit
the evidence. Given the political system within which most judges
operate,5s a judge will be disinclined to exercise his discretion to
exclude evidence. The public, which is concerned with effective law
enforcement,59 will not be impressed with the claim that the decision to exclude evidence was appropriate to safeguard a criminal's
constitutional rights. Moreover, the judge will not even be able to
defend his discretionary decision to exclude evidence by asserting
that federal law mandated it. From the public's point of view, the
judge who exercises his discretion to exclude evidence is choosing
to make it more difficult to convict an accused criminal. Because a
judge will not want to be perceived as impeding effective law enforcement, he will generally exercise his discretion to admit the evidence. From the police perspective, this means that the Fourth
Amendment standards will be lowered.60
If the effect of a discretionary exclusionary rule would be to
lower the constitutional standards, then we need to consider
whether such modification would be wise. By distinguishing between two types of unreasonable police conduct,61 Bradley implies
that some police conduct now subject to the exclusionary rule does
not really need to be deterred. It is interesting to observe, however,
that the only examples Bradley provides of searches that are "un57. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN82 (1955).
58. In this country, most state court judges are elected and therefore particularly susceptible to political pressure. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE
L.J. 1503, App. B (1994).
59. In a national survey, "researchers found that a majority of Americans favor giving
police broader powers to stop and search suspects - even without probable cause - and
would be willing to loosen restrictions on the use of improperly obtained evidence in trials."
Bob Dart, Safety beats freedom in public survey: Americans ready to give up rights to help cut
crime, ATLANTA CoNST., Sept 11, 1994, at A7.
60. See supra text accompanying note 56.
61. See supra part II.
MENT
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reasonable" but not offensive involve search warrant cases that,
under current law, would not be subject to the exclusionary rule.62
In fact, the post-Warren Court has already lowered Fourth Amendment standards to the point where the exclusionary rule is not likely
to apply unless the police conduct is either quite egregious or a
clear violation of an existing rule. 63 Thus, adopting a discretionary
exclusionary rule would be ill-advised because it would further reduce already low constitutional safeguards .
. III.

THE PROPOSED 'FEDE:RAL COMMISSION

Bradley's proposed federal commission would enact a code of
constitutional criminal procedure. According to Bradley, one of
the benefits of this enterprise is that it would add clarity to the law
of criminal procedure (p. 145). From a theoretical perspective,
however; it is difficult to see how a commission could add clarity to
the law when its task would essentially be to "codify[ ] ... current
Supreme Court law ... [without] substantially changing the law's
ideological content" (p. 145). As Bradley emphasizes, the Court's
current criminal procedure law is hopelessly muddled. Moreover,
as I indicated in Part I, much of the current law's lack of clarity
stems from the ideological tension between the Warren Court and
its successors. Clarifying the law without changing its ideological
content would be difficult, if not impossible.
An example that Bradley discusses illustrates the nature of the
problem. In New York v. Belton, 64 the Court established the rule
that an officer who makes "a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile ... may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile,''65 including any containers found in the passenger area.66 The Court
justified this rule as an extension of Chime!, and it specifically de62. The only examples Bradley cites are "the searches in Leon and Spine/IL" P. 56.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), holds that the search warrant at issue was
invalid because of the insufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause. In Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983), the Court overruled Spinelli and established a much more lenient standard
of probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), also involves the validity of a
search warrant. Under the more lenient Gates standard, the affidavit of probable cause in
Leon would have almost certainly been sufficient. The Court did not consider that issue,
however, but instead decided that evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant in Leon would
be admissible because the officers executing the warrant had an objectively reasonable belief
that the warrant was valid.
63. For a discussion of some of the ways in which the Court has lowered Fourth Amendment standards, see Kamisar, supra note 50, at 39-42.
64. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
65. 453 U.S. at 460.
66. 453 U.S. at 460-61 (holding that the police may examine the contents of any containers, both opened and closed, found within the passenger compartment of a car, including
glove compartments).
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nied that its holding disturbed that precedent in any way.67 Under
Chime!, the officer's power to search incident to arrest extends to
the area within the physical control of the arrestee.68 The Court in
Belton concluded that when the police arrest the occupant of an
automobile, the passenger compartment of the automobile is "generally, even if not inevitably, within" the area of the search authorized by Chime[. 69 In order to provide clear guid~ce to the police,
the Court created a bright·line rule that permits searches of the passenger compartment.7o
As Justice Brennan observed·in dissent,71 however, Belton cannot be viewed as consistent with Chime!. When, as in Belton itself,72 the occupant of an' automobile· is arrested,outside of the car,
it would be implausible to claim that the interior of the vehicle is
within the arrestee's physical control. Moreover, there is even less
reason to believe that containers within the interior of the automobile - including locked luggage - will be within the arrestee's
control. Thus, Belton is an example of the post-Warren Court
straining precedent to reach a result favorable to law enforcement.
Belton seems to provide a clear rule. But, as Justice Brennan
pointed out,73 Belton does not resolve some issues related to an officer's authority to search an automobile incident to an arrest. For
example, once the occupant has been arrested, how long may the
police wait before conducting a warrantless search of his auto? Will
Belton apply even if the police established probable cause to arrest
the occupant only after he left the vehicle? If the officer has authority to search the passenger compartment of the automobile,
may the search include the interior of door panels or the area under
the floorboards?74
67. 453 U.S. at 460 n.3 ("Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of
Chimel's principles in this particular •.. context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful
custodial arrests.").
68. See supra text accompanying note 39.
69. 453 U.S. at 460.
70. 453 U.S. at 460.
71. 453 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. The police officer in Belton directed the arrestee to get out of the car, placed him on
an area of the New York Thruway, arrested and searched him, and then proceeded to search
the automobile. 453 U.S. at 456.
73. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. 453 U.S. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, as Alschuler has said, Belton
may have implications for other search-incident-to-arrest situations. The government might
argue, for example:
Just as the Court permitted an officer to search a jacket in an automobile that had been
near an arrestee at the time of his arrest despite the fact that the arrestee had been
removed from the area, an officer should be allowed to search a jacket in a room that an
arrestee no longer occupies so long as the jacket had been within the arrestee's "grabbing area" at the time of arrest.
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Brennan observes that a police officer will have difficulty answering these questions because the Court "abandons the justifications underlying Chimel"75 without providing any new rationale.
Will a commission be in any better position to answer these questions than the police? What rationale should guide their decisionmaking? If the commission focuses on the majority's statement in
Belton - that they are adhering to Chime[ and simply establishing
a bright-line rule that will be easy to administer - then the questions posed above will be answered adversely to the police76 because in these situations the police cannot plausibly claim that the
area they searched was within the arrestee's control. On the other
hand, if the commission rejects the Chime[ rationale on the ground
that it does not justify the Belton rule,77 what new rationale should
the commission apply?
In explaining how the commission might operate, Bradley answers some of the questions that Belton fails to resolve (p. 157). He
states, for example, that the search incident to the arrest nee!f not
be contemporaneous with the arrest78 and that the police will not
be permitted to search areas inaccessible to passengers, such as the
"the area under the floorboards, and the area behind door panels"
(p. 157). While these answers may be helpful to the police, they
seem arbitrary because they do not stem from any consistent view
of the Fourth Amendment. Based on Belton, the opposite answers
to these questions would be just as reasonable. Thus, if Bradley's
proposed commission follows his mandate, it will be unable to pro- ·
duce guidelines that are meaningful in the sense that they reflect a
consistent view of the relevant constitutional provisions.
Bradley might respond that, because the police's need for guidance is so great, answers that do not reflect a consistent view of
the relevant constitutional provisions are better than no answers at
all. I do not dispute that the police need guidance. My point is that
the commission could not be ideologically neutral. In many instances, the members would have to draw their answers from their
own values, rather than from those reflected in the Court's criminal
procedure decisions. Indeed, it appears Bradley drew his answers
to the issues posed by the Belton case from values that were not
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227,
283-84 (1984).
75. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. In these situations it cannot be said that the area to be searched is "generally, even if
not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary ite[m].'" 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969) (alteration in original)).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
78. P. 157. Bradley does not, however, specify how long an officer who arrests the occupant of an automobile may wait before conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle.
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articulated by Chime!, Belton, or any other applicable Fourth
Amendment decision.19
Of course, Bradley contemplates that the commission he proposes would have wide powers and would also engage in some law
reform. He suggests, for example, that the commission should seek
to remedy one of the criminal justice system's most pernicious
problems, mistaken identifications stemming from suggestive identifi.cation procedures,80 by providing that lineups and other identifi.cations "be photographed and tape recorded (or videotaped) and
that these records be produced in court" (p. 84). A commission
that would address the most important problems ·in our system of
justice and that would be inclined foward adopting solutions that
provide greater fairness to criminal suspects would indeed make a
substantial contribution. Would the commission proposed by Bradley be so inclined?
Who would be appointed to the commission? Although Bradley would like to minimize Congres~'s role in the work of the commission,81 Congress would appoint the members of the commission.
Given the current political climate, the commission's membership
would certainly reflect the conservative constitutional view of the
present congressional majority. A commission so composed would
be more conservative than the current Supreme Court. Would such
a commission be likely to provide new protections for criminal
suspects?
·
ldentifi.cation procedures provide an apt example. If the commission addressed the question of the admissibility of identifi.cation
evidence, would it be inclined to reform police practices at lineups
and other identifi.cations as suggested by Bradley? In 1968, when
Congress was much less conservative than it is now, it passed a statute dealing with identifi.cation evidence. But, instead of providing
79. Bradley states, for example, that he would extend the search pennitted by Belton
because "[g]iven the privacy intrusion already occasioned by the arrest and search incident
thereto, the clarity achieved by extending Belton . . • outweighs any further intrusion on
privacy." P. 157. Although individual Justices have endorsed the view that a greater infringement of privacy, such as an arrest, justifies a lesser infringement, such as an extended
search incident to arrest, Chime! flatly rejects this rationale, see 395 U.S. at 766 n.12, and the
Court has never adopted it.
80. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (presenting numerous
cases in which completely innocent people were convicted by reason of misidentification);
JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NoT GUILTY (De Capo Press 1971) (1957) (demonstrating, through examples relating to the fallibility of witnesses, the capacity of the legal
system to produce injustices); EUZABETH F. LoFrUs, & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS
FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PuTs MEMORY
oN TRIAL (1991) (recounting cases in which defendants convicted on the basis of eyewitness
testimony were later shown to be not guilty).
81. P. 145. Bradley proposes that Congress appoint a speciiil bipartisan commission or
expand the power of the committee that drafts the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
that the legislature should retain only the authority to approve or disapprove the final
product.
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procedures for the police to follow, the 1968 Crime Control and
Safe Street ActB2 simply provided that the Court's identification decisions should be restricted so that eyewitness testimony would
never be excluded from federal criminal trials.B3 Given today's
political realities, Bradley's proposed commission would be much
more likely to adopt this kind of approach than it would be to adopt
procedures that provide protections for those accused of serious
crimes.
Delegating. constitutional rulemaking power to a federal commission raises serious constitutional' issues that Bradley addresses
(pp. 150-54). Assuming that Congress could give the commission
power to act as Bradley proposes, in my judgment it would not be
sound policy for Congress to establish this commission. If Supreme
Court doctrine in fact constrained the commission, then the commission would encounter difficulty in constructing a coherent body
of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, to the extent that the commission would be free to address problems in the administration of
justice, political realities dictate that the commission would be unlikely to address these problems in a manner that would enhance
the fairness of our system of justice.
IV.

THE FAILED REVOLUTION?

In assessing the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions,
Bradley focuses almost entirely on its decisions regulating police
practices.84 He concludes that the criminal procedure revolution
failed because it did not "provide adequate guidance to police as to
what to do" (p. 38). I have argued that the lack of clarity in the
current constitutional rules governing search and seizure and confessions stems at least in part from the ideological tension between
the Warren Court and its successors.85 Nevertheless, if the criterion
for a successful criminal procedure revolution is whether the
82. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988)).
83. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 reads:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a
criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under article III of the
Constitution of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 3502. Inferior federal courts have ignored the legislation, feeling bound by the
Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution. See Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpreta·
tion and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 249-50 (1970).
84. Although Bradley explains that the Warren Court applied nearly all of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights to the states (p. 18), he does not discuss the impact of decisions such as
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which provided new constitutional protections to
criminal defendants at trial.
85. See supra Part I.
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Court's decisions provide "adequate guidance" to the police, then
no Court could succeed.
As Professor Anthony Amsterdam has explained, when the
Court reviews police conduct in criminal procedure cases,
[i]ts view of the questioned conduct is limited to the appearance of
the conduct on a particular trial record or records - records which
may not even isolate or focus precisely upon that conduct. The Court
cannot know whether the conduct before it is typical or atypical, unC<?nnected or connected with a set of other practices qr - if there is
some connection - what is the comprehensive shape of the set of
practices involved, what are their .relations, their justifications, their
consequences.86
· ·
·. _.
~
"

Operating within this vacuum, the Court is deprived of the ability
"to develop any organized regulation of ... police conduct."87
Does this mean that the Warren Court's attempt to regulate police conduct was misguided? Echoing the views of more conservative commentators,ss Bradley suggests that the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions caused "Congress and state legislatures [to] largely abandon[] the field" (p. 144). But this is nonsense. Prior to the Warren Court criminal procedure decisions,
Congress and the state legislatures had already completely abandoned the field. Indeed, "a vast abnegation of responsibility . . .
forced the Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday
functioning of the police."89 If the legislatures were interested in
regulating police conduct, why did they fail to do so?
Moreover, the Wan;en Court did not preempt the legislatures.
On the contrary, in some of its landmark decisions, the Court expressly invited Congress and other i;igencies to participate in providing rules for the police. In Miranda, for example, the Court stated
that the specified procedures would be required."unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons 'of their right
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 90
Similarly, in United States v. Wade, 91 the Court emphasized that
"[l]egislative or other regulations ... eliminat[ing] the risks of abuse
and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial" 92 . could displace the
constitutional requirement imposed by the Court. In both cases,
86. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 791 (1970).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A
Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 938, 949 (1987).·
89. Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 790.
90. 384 U.S. at 444.
91. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
92. 388 U.S. at 239.
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the Court invited Congress to provide regulations that would address a significant issue relating to the fairness of our system of justice. In both cases, Congress failed to provide a meaningful
response. 93 Thus, the criminal procedure revolution should not be
faulted on the ground that it prevented Congress or other agencies
from regulating police conduct.
In deciding whether the criminal procedure revolution was a
failure, the real question should not be whether the Court has provided adequate guidance for the police but, rather, whether the
Court's decisions improved our system of justice. In my judgment,
the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions led to several salutary developments that probably would not have occurred
otherwise.
First, as Bradley notes (p. 37), the Court decisions changed police practices by making the police more sensitive to constitutional
rights. As a result of the exclusionary rule, the police have received
extensive training in criminal procedure. Even if some of the specific rules promulgated by the Court are unclear or ineffective, the
training provided to the police makes it less likely that they will
flagrantly violate a suspect's constitutional rights. Thus, even if the
Miranda decision has too many loopholes to be effective,94 that decision may have played a part in causing the virtual disappearance
of the "third degree."95
Second, the Warren Court decisions identified problems in the
administration of ju~tice that the courts can ameliorate. Perhaps
the most notable example is the problem of suggestive police identification procedures identified in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy. 96
Prior to the lineup decisions, defendants' claims that identification
evidence should be excluded because of suggestive identification
procedures were dismissed as fanciful. 97 Wade and its progeny exposed the problem of miscarriages of justices occurring as a result
of suggestive procedures and demonstrated that courts can provide
remedies that will address this problem. Even though the postWarren Court has sharply limited the Warren Court's lineup decisions,98 those decisions continue to have an impact because state
93. In the 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill, Congress sought to repeal Miranda and Wade. See
supra note 82. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 802.
94. See supra note 26.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
97. See, e.g., Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
98. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (replacing Stovall's per se rule by which
identifications stemming from unnecessarily suggestive procedures are excluded under a to·
tality-of-circumstances test in which identifications stemming from unnecessarily suggestive
procedures are not excluded unless there is "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (limiting Wade to identifications conducted after formal prosecutorial proceedings have been initiated).
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courts, recognizing the legitimacy of the Warren Court's concern,
have applied the principles emanating from the lineup decisions as
a matter of state law.99
Finally, the Warren Court criminal procedure decisions benefitted our system of justice by articulating goals. In general terms, the
Warren Court envisioned a system of justice under which the most
important provisions of the Bill of Rights would provide meaningful protection for criminal suspects,100 the inequality between the
treatment afforded rich and poor would be reduced,101 and government officials would treat criminal suspects with greater faimess. 102
Whether these goals are ever realized, they are valuable because
they "state our aspirations. " 103 In a climate in which the public's
rising fear of crime causes increased emphasis on the needs of law
enforcement, these aspirations are especially important. They remind us that, under our Constitution, our system of justice should
be concerned not only with convicting the guilty but also with providing meaningful protections against governmental abuse for both
ordinary citizens and those accused of crimes.

99. See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 519 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a defendant
arrested pursuant to a warrant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a preindictment
lineup); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351(Pa.1974) (holding that a defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a preindictment lineup because, under Pennsylvania
state law, the initiation of adversary proceedings begins when the defendant is arrested).
100. As Bradley observes, nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 84. The Court sought to
ensure that state criminal defendants were provided with at least the same protection that
had previously been afforded federal defendants.
101. See Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 797.
102. Critics sometimes charge that the Warren Court was ~oo concerned with reaching a
just result as opposed to adhering to constitutional principles. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MoRAUTY OF CoNSENT 120-21 (1975) (noting that for Chief Justice Warren the
essential question was whether the result was "right and good").
103. Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 793.

